TITLE: A Philosopher of Imitation
AUTHOR: Eugene Wallingford
DATE: July 20, 2012  3:39 PM
DESC: 
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BODY:
Ian Bogost, in
<A HREF="http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/07/the-great-pretender-turing-as-a-philosopher-of-imitation/259824/">
   The Great Pretender: Turing as a Philosopher of Imitation</A>,
writes:

<BLOCKQUOTE><EM>
Intelligence -- whatever it is, the thing that goes on inside
a human or a machine -- is less interesting and productive a
topic of conversation than the effects of such a process, the
experience it creates in observers and interlocutors.
</EM></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is a very nice one-sentence summary of Turing's thesis in
<A HREF="http://www.loebner.net/Prizef/TuringArticle.html">
   Computing Machinery and Intelligence</A>.
I wrote a bit about
<A HREF="http://www.cs.uni.edu/~wallingf/blog/archives/monthly/2012-03.html#e2012-03-30T17_22_07.htm">
   Turing's ideas on machine intelligence</A>
a few months back, but the key idea in Bogost's essay relates
more closely to my discussion in
<A HREF="http://www.cs.uni.edu/~wallingf/blog/archives/monthly/2012-04.html#e2012-04-06T16_29_33.htm">
   Turing's ideas on representation and universal machines</A>.

In this centennial year of his birth, we can hardly go wrong in
considering again and again the depth of Turing's contributions.
Bogost uses a lovely turn of phrase in his title: <EM>a philosopher
of imitation</EM>.  What may sound like a slight or a trifle is,
in fact, the highest of compliments.  Turing made that thinkable.
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